

Message Text

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BOHEMIAN

TO AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y TO ADD SECSTATE AS INFO ADDEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, RP

SUBJ: PHILIPPINE BASE NEGOTIATIONS: ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY ROMUALDEZ JUNE 21.

REF: A. MANILA 09829; B. BAGUIO 00029

1. IN DRAFTING REPLY WE HAVE TRIED TO PROVIDE CANDID RESPONSES TO COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE QUESTIONS BUT AT SAME TIME AVOID ISSUES WHERE OUR POSITIONS MAY DIFFER, SUCH AS APPLICABILITY OF MDT OBLIGATIONS TO SPRATLYS OR WHERE GOP MIGHT FIND SUPPORT FOR FIRMER BARGAINING STANCE. WE ARE ALSO MINDFUL OF POSSIBILITY THAT REPLY COULD EVENTUALLY LEAK TO PRESS.

2. IN LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS AND IN ORDER TO OPTIMIZE THE REACTION OF ROMUALDEZ AND MARCOS, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO GIVE REPLY TO ROMUALDEZ AS CONTAINED IN THE FOLLOWING TEXT. YOU COULD IN ADDITION PROPOSE TO ROMUALDEZ THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH HIM, OR WITH HIM AND PRESIDENT MARCOS, TO SUPPLEMENT THE REPLY WITH EXPLANATION OF SOME OF THE MORE SENSITIVE POINTS.

3. YOU COULD IN ORAL DISCUSSION INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

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(A) AS REGARDS RESPONSE TO THE FOURTH QUESTION ABOUT THE INDIAN OCEAN, YOU COULD POINT OUT THAT CHINA IS AMONG THOSE STATES WHICH HAVE SUPPORTED A STRONG US ROLE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. (B) THE REPLY TO THE SIXTH QUESTION MAKES NO REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE US AND GOP DIFFERENCES IN INTER-

PRETATION OF THE MDT. YOU COULD GIVE MARCOS THE STATE-
MENT OF US POSITION YOU MADE TO ROM'ALDEZ AT YOUR MEETING
ON JULY 3 (MANILA 9675, PARA.5).

4. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSED REPLY FOR YOUR SIGNA-
TURE TO ROMUALDEZ: (BEGIN TEXT) EXCELLENCY:

I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON
SECURITY ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN IN REPLYING TO YOUR
LETTER OF JUNE 21.

THE UNITED STATES, LIKE THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, IS A NATION OF THE PACIFIC BASIN AND HAS A
VITAL STAKE IN ASIA. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES SHARES OUR VIEW THAT OUR MUTUAL SECURITY
RELATIONSHIP SERVES HIGHLY IMPORTANT INTERESTS OF BOTH OU
COUNTRIES. INDEED, THE PRESIDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THEIR JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF
DECEMBER 7, 1975, STATED "THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE TREATY
OF AUGUST 30, 1951, ENHANCED THE DEFENSE OF BOTH COUN-
TRIES, STRENGTHENED THE SECURITY OF THE PACIFIC REGION,
AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF WORLD PEACE. THEY
AGREED THAT THE MILITARY BASES USED BY THE UNITED STATES
IN THE PHILIPPINES REMAIN IMPORTANT IN MAINTAINING AN
EFFECTIVE US PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC IN SUPPORT
OF THESE MUTUAL OBJECTIVES."

EQUILIBRIUM IN THE PACIFIC, WHERE MAJOR POWER CON-
CERNS INTERSECT, IS ESSENTIAL BOTH TO THE UNITED STATES
AND TO THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE PACIFIC, AND IT CAN
NEITHER BE CREATED NOR SUSTAINED WITHOUT AMERICAN
STRENGTH. AS YOU KNOW, WE BELIEVE WE CAN CONTRIBUTE
AS WELL BY SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF OUR LONG-STANDING
ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN ASIA IN THEIR EFFORTS TO
PRESERVE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, DEFEND THEIR INDE-
PENDENCE, DEVELOP THEIR ECONOMIES AND
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STRENGTHEN THEIR REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS. PRESIDENT FORD HAS
LAID PARTICULAR STRESS ON OUR CONTINUING STAKE IN STABILITY
AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, NOTING THAT THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES IS ONE OF OUR OLDEST ALLIES AND THAT OUR
FRIENDSHIP DEMONSTRATES OUR LONG-STANDING INTEREST IN ASIA.

I. THE FIRST QUESTION POSED IN YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 21 RE-
LATED TO THE BASIC STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
WESTERN PACIFIC AND THE ROLE OF THE BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES

THE BASIC OBJECTIVE OF THE US DEFENSE STRATEGY IN THE PACIF-
IC IS CLEARLY STATED IN PRESIDENT FORD'S PACIFIC DOCTRINE
--THE PRESERVATION OF REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY. WITH-
IN THE CONTEXT OF THAT DOCTRINE AND THE US DEFENSE STRATEGY

IT DESCRIBES, THE BASE FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES USED BY THE UNITED STATES AFFORD MUTUAL BENEFIT TO BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. THESE FACILITIES ARE A KEY ELEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN DEFENSE COMMITMENT TO THE PHILIPPINES AS EMBODIED IN THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY. ADDITIONALLY, THEY CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT LINK IN OUR DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE PACIFIC, AND THIS FORMS PART OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE REGION FROM WHICH BOTH THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES--AS WELL AS THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION--DERIVE BENEFITS.

US FORCES IN EAST ASIA AND THE BASES FROM WHICH THEY OPERATE SIGNIFY IN A VISIBLE WAY OUR RESOLVE TO CONTINUE TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE REGIONAL BALANCE AND PROVIDE US A CAPACITY TO PERFORM THAT FUNCTION. IN ADDITION TO THEIR DETERRENT FUNCTION, THEY PERFORM DEFENSIVE NAVAL MISSIONS; THEY PERMIT US TO MEET COROLLARY REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS AND LOGISTICAL MAINTENANCE CAPABILITIES.

II. THE SECOND QUESTION RELATED TO PERCEIVED THREATS IN THE REGION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILITIES.

UNLIKE THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS WHERE PRECISE LINES ARE DRAWN AND THE MILITARY THREAT IS WELL DEFINED,
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THE PACIFIC REGION IS CHARACTERIZED BY GREATER UNCERTAINTIES INHERENT IN THE FLUID STATE OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, NOT LEAST THE FUTURE CONTOURS OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, THE INTENTIONS OF THE NEW REGIMES IN INDOCHINA, AND THE OBJECTIVES THE SOVIET UNION MAY CHOOSE TO PURSUE IN ASIA AS ITS CAPACITY TO PROJECT FORCE IN THE AREA GROWS OVER TIME.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT MILITARY FORCES BE AVAILABLE IN THE AREA TO BALANCE THE CAPABILITIES OF POTENTIALLY HOSTILE POWERS AND TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO A WIDE RANGE OF CONTINGENT SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT ENDANGER REGIONAL STABILITY.

III. THE THIRD QUESTION RELATES TO U.S. COMMITMENTS OR NATIONAL POLICIES REGARDING INDONESIA, THAILAND, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, KOREA, JAPAN, AND AUSTRALIA.

THE UNITED STATES HAS BILATERAL DEFENSE TREATY COMMITMENTS WITH JAPAN, KOREA, TAIWAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES. WE ALSO HAVE MULTILATERAL DEFENSE TREATY COMMITMENTS WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, AND PURSUANT TO THE MANILA TREATY WITH THESE COUNTRIES AS WELL AS WITH THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY AFFIRMED OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THESE MUTUAL COMMITMENTS IN

ACCORDANCE WITH OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. OUR FORWARD MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN THE PACIFIC AREA, INCLUDING OUR FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES, ARE A CLEAR-CUT MANIFESTATION OF OUR INTENTIONS IN THIS REGARD.

WE HAVE NO DEFENSE COMMITMENTS TO INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, AND SINGAPORE, BUT WE ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THESE NATIONS TO PROTECT THEIR SECURITY, PRESERVE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, AND MAINTAIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE. OUR SUPPORT HAS BEEN MANIFEST IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO HELP THEM ACHIEVE INCREASING SELF-RELIANCE FOR DEFENSE AGAINST EITHER EXTERNAL OR INTERNAL THREATS. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY ENDORSED THE EFFORTS OF FRIENDLY NATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TO STRENGTHEN THEIR REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, SUCH AS ASEAN.

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IV. THE FOURTH QUESTION RELATED TO U.S. POLICIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND DEFENSE FACILITIES IN DIEGO GARCIA.

THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED WITH REGIONAL STABILITY AND MILITARY BALANCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA. FURTHERMORE, THE SECURITY OF THE INDIAN OCEAN SEA ROUTES IS VITAL TO THE CONTINUED SUPPLY OF MIDDLE EASTERN OIL TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, BOTH IN EUROPE AND ASIA. A US ROLE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS THUS BEEN WELCOMED BY WESTERN EUROPE, AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN AS WELL AS BY THE PRC AND CERTAIN REGIONAL STATES IN EAST ASIA (INCLUDING SOME ASEAN MEMBERS) ON THE OTHER.

THE US HAS ONLY LIMITED FORCES BASED PERMANENTLY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AT BAHRAIN IN THE PERSIAN GULF. WE

THEREFORE DRAW PRIMARILY ON FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION TO DEPLOY NAVAL STRENGTH INTO THE REGION. THE FACILITIES AT DIEGO GARCIA ENABLE US TO SUPPORT THESE DEPLOYMENTS MORE EFFICIENTLY AND ECONOMICALLY, BUT ARE ONLY SUPPLEMENTARY TO OUR BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES WHICH FACILITATE PERIODIC NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN AND SUPPORT THE EFFICIENT RESUPPLY OF OUR OPERATIONS THERE. IN GENERAL, THE PACIFIC RESUPPLY ROUTE WITH ITS KEY LINKS AT CLARK AND SUBIC IS THE BEST ALTERNATIVE TO THE ATLANTIC ROUTE INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN.

V. THE FIFTH QUESTION ASKED HOW THE USE OF FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINE BASES IS RELATED TO U.S. BASES IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES COMPLEMENT OUR OTHER FACILITIES IN THE REGION IN AN INTERLOCKING NETWORK, A NETWORK WHICH PROVIDES THE CAPABILITY TO REACT QUICKLY

AND TO RESPOND TO CHANGING CONDITIONS. PHILIPPINE BASES PROVIDE IMPORTANT REPAIR FACILITIES, AFFORD A SUPPORTING LINK IN ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS, AND PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS AS WELL AS COMMAND AND CONTROL LINKS FOR OUR PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN FACILITIES. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BASES IN THE NETWORK IS ONE OF COMPLEMENTARITY, AND IN SOME CASES NECESSARY REDUNDANCY SUCH AS WITH
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COMMUNICATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT TO MAINTAIN A READY POSTURE WE MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THE FLEXIBILITY NECESSARY TO ADJUST THIS INTERLOCKING SET OF BASE FACILITIES TO ADAPT TO NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CHANGES.

VI. THE SIXTH QUESTION ASKED WHAT ARE THE REAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER OUR MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY.

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY EXPRESSES THE REAL MUTUAL DEFENSE INTERESTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS AS MUCH TODAY AS WHEN IT ENTERED INTO FORCE IN 1952. WE CONSIDER OUR OBLIGATIONS TO BE AS FOLLOWS:

-- TO UNDERTAKE TO SETTLE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS;

--TO SEPARATELY AND JOINTLY MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP THE CAPACITY TO RESIST ARMED ATTACK;

-- TO CONSULT REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY;

-- TO RECOGNIZE THAT AN ARMED ATTACK IN THE PACIFIC AREA ON EITHER OF THE PARTIES WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO ITS PEACE AND SAFETY AND TO ACT TO MEET THE COMMON DANGER.

FORCES AND BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES ENHANCE MEASURABLY THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO HONOR THESE COMMITMENTS AND ARE A CONCRETE MANIFESTATION OF OUR INTENTION TO DO SO.

VII. THE SEVENTH QUESTION RELATED TO THE SPECIFIC MISSIONS AND COMPONENTS OF THE U.S. FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES.

A. THE MISSION OF COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL BASE, SUBIC BASE IS AS FOLLOWS:

"TO PROVIDE, THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF COORDINATION OF SHORE ACTIVITIES IN THE SUBIC BAY/CUBI POINT COMPLEX
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ASSIGNED TO THE AREA COORDINATION OF COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL BASE, SUBIC BAY, COMPLETE LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO OPERATING FLEET UNITS, TRANSIENT VESSELS AND OTHER NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES AS DIRECTED; AND LIMITED SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND TO OTHER SERVICES OF THE U.S. GOVT AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET OR HIGHER AUTHORITY; TO EXERCISE COMMAND OF ASSIGNED SHORE ACTIVITIES LOCATED IN THE SUBIC BAY/CUBI POINT COMPLEX WHICH INCLUDES LAND AREAS IN THE PROVINCES OF ZAMBALES AND BATAAN AND THE WATER AREA OF SUBIC BAY RESERVED FOR NAVAL PURPOSES AND CONTROLLED BY U.S. NAVY PURSUANT TO THE UNITED STATES/PHILIPPINES MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT.

COMMANDER U.S. NAVAL BASE SUBIC BAY ALSO FUNCTIONS AS COMMANDER U.S. NAVAL FORCES, PHILIPPINES WITH AREA COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITIES AS FOLLOWS: "IMMEDIATE AREA COORDINATION FOR ALL PERSONNEL IN THE NAVAL SERVICE LOCATED ASHORE AND FOR SHORE ACTIVITIES IN OTHER AREAS AS DESIGNATED BY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET INCLUDING THOSE ASSIGNED TO THE LOCAL AREA COORDINATION OF COMMANDER U.S. NAVAL BASE, SUBIC BAY, LUZON, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. LOCAL AREA COORDINATOR FOR ALL PERSONNEL IN THE NAVAL SERVICE LOCATED ASHORE AND FOR ALL SHORE ACTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES."

B. THE MISSION COMMANDER, THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE IS AS FOLLOWS:

"PROVIDE COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER PACAF FORCES, UNITS AND RESOURCES LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES AND ELSEWHERE AS TASKED.

ORGANIZE, EQUIP, TRAIN, AND ADMINISTER FORCES ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED AND MAINTAIN THEM AT A HIGH DEGREE OF COMBAT READINESS WHICH WILL INSURE SUCCESS OF AIR OPERATIONS DIRECTED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.

PROVIDE ALERT AND NON-ALERT AIRCRAFT AND AIRCREWS FOR OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS IN THE PACAF AREA.

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BE READY TO DEPLOY AND PROVIDE AIR SUPERIORITY COVER AS DIRECTED AND MAINTAIN AIR DEFENSE ALERT OF THE PHILIPPINES ON A 24-HOUR BASIS.

MAINTAIN AND OPERATE THE AIR CONTROL AND WARNING FACILITIES AT WALLACE AIR STATION TO PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL INFORMATION TO THE PHILIPPINE AIR DEFENSE

CONTROL CENTER, AND TO COORDINATE AND CONTROL AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

MAINTAIN AND OPERATE FACILITIES AT CAMP O'DONNELL AND CROW VALLEY BOMBING AND GUNNERY RANGE TO PROVIDE AIRCREW OPERATIONAL READINESS TRAINING.

MAINTAIN AND OPERATE AC&W AND DRONE LAUNCH FACILITIES AT WALLACE AIR STATION TO PROVIDE A CREW OPERATIONAL READINESS TRAINING.

MAINTAIN AND OPERATE JOHN HAY AIR BASE TO PROVIDE CONFERENCE FACILITIES, A REST AND RECREATIONAL AREA AND A COMMUNICATION SUPPORT FACILITY.

PROVIDE COMPLETE LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO ALL UNITS AND PERSONNEL ASSIGNED, ATTACHED OR OPERATING THROUGH CLARK AIR BASE, JOHN HAY AIR BASE AND WALLACE AIR STATION.

PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERSERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENTS FOR THOSE DOD ACTIVITIES AND INTERDEPARTMENTAL ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES WITHIN THE THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.

PLAN AND CONDUCT A CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM IN SURROUNDING AREA.

PROVIDE SUPPORT THAT WILL MAINTAIN ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED AIRLIFT FORCES AT A DEGREE OF COMBAT READINESS THAT WOULD INSURE EFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND WOULD PROVIDE INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT FOR ELEMENTS OF THE PACIFIC COMMAND."

C. INFORMATION ON COMPONENTS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES HAS
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BEEN PROVIDED IN CONSIDERABLE DEPTH TO THE PHILIPPINE PANEL THROUGH TOURS OF THE BASES AND DETAILED DISCUSSIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALSO DISCUSSED IN DETAIL DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE, THEIR MISSIONS WILL BE IMPAIRED BY ANY REDUCTION IN AREA AND NUMBER OF FACILITIES IN A DEGREE COMMENSURATE WITH THE RESULTING LOSS OF FLEXIBILITY AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS INVOLVED."

VIII. THE EIGHTH QUESTION ASKED WHAT ARE THE PURPOSES AND OPTIMUM NUMBER OF FACILITIES NEEDED BY THE U.S. FORCES AND EXPRESSED PHILIPPINE CONCERN REGARDING POSSIBLE PREEMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST ITS TERRITORY.

A CREDIBLE DETERRENT AGAINST AGGRESSIVE ACTS IN THE REGION REQUIRES NOT ONLY THE TIMELY DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AGAINST A THREAT (OPERATIONAL CONTROL) BUT ALSO THE

FACILITIES TO KEEP FORCES IN A READY POSTURE. THESE FORCES MUST BE LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED IN A FORWARD LOCATION (ADEQUATE BASE REPAIR AND LOGISTICAL FACILITIES), BE PROVIDED WITH CAPABILITIES TO MAINTAIN COMBAT READINESS (TRAINING AREAS), BE CONTROLLED THROUGH A RELIABLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES), AND BE MANNED WITH HIGHLY MOTIVATED, DISCIPLINED AND PHYSICALLY CONDITIONED PERSONNEL (SUPPORT, RECREATION AND WELFARE FACILITIES).

OUR DELEGATIONS ARE NOW DISCUSSING IN DETAIL THE QUESTION OF FACILITIES TO BE USED BY U.S. FORCES. THE U.S. NEGOTIATING PANEL WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE ADJUSTMENTS THAT WE THINK CAN BE MADE WITHOUT WEAKENING THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR MILITARY FORCES AND THUS PREJUDICING OUR ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

WE SHARE YOUR CONCERN THAT PHILIPPINE TERRITORY NOT BECOME A TARGET OF A HOSTILE ATTACK. THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINS A WORLDWIDE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE WHOSE MISSION IS TO DETER PREEMPRIVE STRIKES AGAINST OUR ALLIES AND OURSELVES. WHILE THESE FORCES CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, THEY ARE NOT THEMSELVES LOCATED THERE. HENCE THE PHILIPPINES WOULD NOT BE SUB-SECRET

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JECT TO ANY PREEMPTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKES.

I HOPE THAT THESE RESPONSES TO YOUR QUESTIONS WILL AID IN UNDERSTANDING OUR POSITIONS. I BELIEVE THAT THEY ACCURATELY REFLECT THE MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS WE SHARE IN THESE AREAS. I HOPE THAT OUR JOINT RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR A STABLE AND SECURE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT REFLECTING OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS AND PURPOSES.

/S/ AMBASSADOR WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN (END TEXT)

5. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED TO ROMUALDEZ THAT CONTENTS OF THIS LETTER, PARTICULARLY ANSWER TO SEVENTH QUESTION, ARE SECRET AND SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED. KISSINGER

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